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NEGLIGENCE-RIGHT To RECOVER FOR PRE-NATAL INJURIES-The plaintiff-infant by his guardian ad litem brought an action against the defendant
alleging that while he was en ventre sa mere during the ninth month of
his mother's pregnancy, he sustained, through the defendant's negligence,
such serious injuries that he was born permanently maimed and disabled.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
The appellate division affinned.1 On appeal, held, reversed, two judges
dissenting. A complaint alleging pre-natal injuries tortiously inflicted on a
nine month foetus viable at the time and actually born later states a good
cause of action. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. (2d) 691 (1951).
Where recovery has been sought by an infant for injuries negligently
inflicted upon him while en ventre sa mere, the existence of a right of
action has generally been denied. 2 However, some recent cases, including
the principal case, have recognized that an unborn child has a legally protected right to be free from tortious injury.3 These have indicated that the

l Woods v. Lancet, 278 App. Div. 913, 105 N.Y.S. (2d) 417 (1951), following
Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), heretofore a leading authority
denying recovery for pre-natal injuries. The principal case overrules the Drobner case.
2 10 A.L.R. (2d) 1059 (1950) (for collection of all cases dealing with this problem
in the United States). See also Muse and Spinella, ''Right of Infant to Recover for Prenatal
Injury," 36 VA. L. Rav. 611 (1950).
s The New York court in overruling prior authority did what the Massachusetts court
expressly refused to do in Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E. (2d) 206 (1950).
A note criticising the Massachusetts case and developing the reasons for allowing recovery
to the unborn child appears in 50 MrcR. L. Rav. 166 (1951). Cases allowing recovery
subsequent to that note are Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, (Md. 1951) 79 A. (2d) 550; Tucker
v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E. (2d) 909 (1951); Contra~
Amann v. Faidy, (ill. App. 1952) 107 N.E. (2d) 868.
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action will be restricted to situations in which the injury is to a "viable"4
foetus, 5 and the child survives birth. 6 The viability requirement is apparently due to the influence of the cases that traditionally have denied recovery
altogether on the theory that the unborn child has no separate existence
until it is severed from the mother.7 In light of the recognition by medical
science that the embryo is in esse from conception,8 there appears to be no
justification for saying that a foetus is part of the mother until viable.
Apart from the fact that the viability rule is impossible of practical application, 9 it is unjust in that it arbitrarily distinguishes between children bearing
similar injuries and equally entitled to recompense. It is true that causal
connection is more difficult to establish in the earlier stages of the child's
pre-natal development;10 nevertheless the relation between the negligence
and the injury to the non-viable infant can be established.11 Competent
medical evidence should be required, but a legal right should not be denied
merely because of difficulty of proof. So long as courts are preoccupied by
the viability requirement, the formulation of a rational delimitation of the
action based on the ordinary duty concepts cannot be perfected. It appears,
as a matter of coincidence, that the results reached under the viability rule
will approximate the limits of the defendant's duty in those states following
the majority opinion in the Palsgraf 2 case. The duty to exercise due care
is imposed only when the defendant could reasonably foresee an undue
risk of injury to the infant; unless he knew or should have known of the
existence of the infant, he could foresee no injury to it. Ordinarily a stranger
has no way of knowing of the mother's pregnancy until her condition becomes
4 A viable foetus is " ••• alive and capable of being delivered and of remaining alive,
separate from its mother." Principal case at 695. See also DoRLAND, AMER. Ir.r.us. MEDICAL Dxcr., 21st ed., 1616 (1947). In Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, supra note 3, the court
adopted a limitation similar to the criminal law concept of "quickening." The child is
"quick'' when its fust motion in the womb is felt by the mother, occurring usually abaut
the middle of pregnancy. BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY, 4th ed., 1415 (1951).
5 No recent case has been decided involving the right of the non-viable infant to recover, the expxession of the viability rule being confined to obiter dicta. Cf. Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916) (denying recovery
for injuries to a non-viable foetus but indicating that a different result would have been
reached if the foetus had been viable).
6Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. (2d) 229 (1951); cf. Verkennes
v. Comiea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W. (2d) 838 (1949) (recovery by administrator for prenatal injuries allowed under the wrongful death statute).
7 The reasoning was first adopted by Holmes, C.J., in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), and has had a profound effect on the development of the
law in this field. For later cases see 10 A.L.R. (2d) 1059 (1950).
8 GRIEsHEIMER, PHYSIOLOGY AND ANATO'MY, 5th ed., 738 (1945); PATTEN, HuMAN
EMBRYOLOGY 181 (1946).
9EMERSON, LEGAL MEDICINE AND ToxxcoLOGY 173-174 (1909). That the age of
viability varies is apparent in the table set out in 3 WHARTON & SnLLEs, MEDICAL Jums•
PRUDENCE, 5th ed., 38 (1905).
10 See Winfield, ''The Unborn Child," 4 TORONTO L.J. 278 at 293 (1942).
11 MAx.oY, LEGAL ANATO'MY AND SURGERY 685, 686 (1930).
12 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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obvious,13 which closely approximates the time that viability occurs. However,
in those jurisdictions adopting the minority view in the Palsgraf case14 the
result could be quite different. The defendant's negligent conduct would
entail liability for all harmful consequences of which it is the proximate
cause. Under this view there would be no logical basis for denying recovery
if the defendant has acted in such a way as to subject anyone to unreasonable
risk of harm and the child is in fact injured thereby. The most serious
limitation15 on the action would then become one of proximate cause which,
practically speaking, could seldom be established when the injury is to
a non-viable infant. It is submitted that the arbitrary requirement of viability
should be discarded, and that the right of the infant injured while en 11entre sa
mere should be made coextensive with whatever concept of duty the court
may adopt in its usual negligence case.16
In the principal case the court indicates that only if the child is born
alive will recovery be allowed. Logically it would seem that, if the child
would have had an action if it had lived, its administrator should be able to
recover under the wrongful death statutes. 17 However, in a recent Nebraska
case18 such an action was denied, the court refusing to express an opinion
as to whether the child would have had an action had it lived. It was
reasoned that since the child was stillborn, it never came into existence as a
person within the contemplation of the law of torts. If this is so, then the
court would have had some difficulty in allowing the child recovery had ·it
lived, for clearly there is no duty owing to a non-existent person. It has been
suggested that a distinction may be justified by defining the child's right as the
right to begin life with a sound body, free from the effects of the defendant's
negligence.19 It is submitted, however, that an unborn child should have an
equal right to be free from death caused by the defendant's negligence. If
it is recognized that the child has separate existence before birth, then any

13 If the defendant did in fact know of the mother's condition, the duty of exercising due care ought to arise. Stemmer v. Kline, 19 N.J. Misc. 15, 17 A. (2d) 58 (1940)
(defendant was the mother's doctor), overruled by 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A. (2d) 489 (1942)
(five judges dissenting).
14 See Cowan, ''The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case," 23 MINN. L. RBv. 46 (1938).
15 Other possible limitations of the action may be imagined. The contributory negligence of the mother might be imputed to the child, thus denying him any action. However,
many jurisdictions do not recognize the imputed negligence doctrine, and in those states
it would be no obstacle. See 35 VA. L. RBv. 618 (1949). It is interesting to speculate as
to whether recovery will be restricted to the personal injury actions or perhaps extended to
include other torts such as the defamatory actions.
16 If the tort is intentionally inflicted upon the person of the mother, it would seem that
the doctrine of transferred intent should allow the plaintiff to maintain an action in b\lttery.
17 Verkennes v. Comiea, supra note 6.
18 Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., supra note 6.
19 63 HARV. L. R.Bv. 173 (1949).
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breach of duty toward that child should be actionable, either by him, or, if he
is born dead, by his administrator under the wrongful death statutes.

James S. Taylor, S.Ed.

